Introduction
In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canada 1996) mandates, the Abella Royal Commission Report (1984) insists, and the Employment Equity Act (Canada and Sakellariou (1993) and Baker and Benjamin (1997) do not examine any of the ethnic groups that make up the white aggregate category. Third, none of these papers examines differences between people who claim only one ethnic origin and people who claim multiple ethnic origins. Fourth, although Baker and Benjamin (1997) use the largest and most recent data set, they do not analyse ethnically based earnings differences among women. We address all of these issues.
We use data from the 1991 Census Public Use Microdata File (PUMF) to examine earnings gaps both between the white and visible-minority aggregate categories and within these categories. Because immigration status has well-known connections with earnings outcomes, we consider Canadian-born and immigrant workers as distinct groups. We first evaluate earnings differences among male and female workers in five aggregate categories: (1) Canadian-born white; (2) Canadianborn visible minority; (3) Aboriginal; (4) Immigrant white; and (5) Immigrant visible minority. Considering groups (1), (2), and (3), we find that, conditional on observable characteristics, Canadian-born visible-minority men face an earnings gap of 8 per cent and Aboriginal men a gap of 13 per cent, in comparison with Canadian-born white men. Considering groups (1), (4), and (5), we find that immigrant white men and immigrant visible-minority men face earnings gaps of 2 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively, in comparison with Canadian-born white men.
We find quite different results for women. Canadian-born visible minority women face no earnings gap in comparison with Canadian-born white women. In contrast, Aboriginal women face an earnings gap of 7 per cent in comparison with Canadian-born white women. Turning to immigrant women, we find that immigrant white women and immigrant visible-minority women face earnings gaps of 1 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively, in comparison with Canadian-born white women. Our findings for aggregate groups are consistent with and reinforce Christofides and Swidinsky's (1994) analysis of wage differentials based on the 1989 LMAS.2,3 The significant earnings gaps we observe between white and visible-minority workers suggest that, especially for men, visible-minority status may be a useful indicator of economic discrimination.
We also evaluate earnings differentials for men and women within the aggregate categories. Within the Canadian-born white aggregate category we examine earnings differentials among fifteen single-and five multiple-origin ethnic groups. Within the Canadian-born visible-minority aggregate category we examine nine single-and seven multiple-origin ethnic groups, and within the Aboriginal aggregate category we examine one single-and two multiple-origin ethnic groups. We also examine corresponding groups for the immigrant aggregate categories. We find 2 Christofides and Swidinsky (1994) evaluate wage differences rather than earnings differences and find an unexplained wage gap between Canadian-born white and visible-minority workers of 6-8 per cent for men and 3 per cent for women. The strength of their conclusions was hampered by the small numbers of Canadian-born visible minorities in LMAS. 3 The large number of working-age Canadian-born visible minorities in the 1991 Census PUMF provides two advantages over earlier Census data and over the LMAS: (1) it permits the identiIication of dilferentials due to visible-minority status as distinct from those due to immigration status; and (2) it permits separate estimates for Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver.
wide variation in the earnings gaps faced by both different ethnic groups within the two white aggregates and different ethnic groups within the two visible-minority aggregates. For example, among Canadian-born white men, Greek-and Balkanorigin men face earnings gaps of over 10 per cent in comparison with British-origin men. As for visible-minority ethnic groups, our estimates are sirnilar to those of Baker and Benjamin (1997) In our sample, approximately one-quarter of the observations fall into our multiple-origin categories. Because more children than adults are multiple origin (1991 Census PUMF), including multiple-origin people in the analysis of discrimination is increasingly important. We find that some multiple-origin workers may face earnings gaps, but only if one or more of their ethnic origins is a visibleminority or Aboriginal ethnic group. In particular, some immigrant visible minority multiple-origin men face earnings differentials of more than 15 per cent in comparison with Canadian-born British-origin men. Similarly, some immigrant visible minority multiple-origin women face earnings differentials of more than 10 per cent in comparison with Canadian-born British-origin women.
Although our results reinforce previous findings from earlier data and suggest that the white/visible-minority distinction does correlate with ethnically based earnings differentials, we also find large unexplained differences in earnings among ethnic groups within the white and visible-minority aggregate categories. This suggests that the visible-minority category is an imperfect indicator of economic discrimination.
Methodology
Our analysis is divided into two parts. First, we examine earnings differentials between whites, visible minorities, and Aboriginals. Second, we refine this analysis by looking at earnings differentials among subgroups of these three basic categories and across cities. Our data are derived from the 1991 PUMF for individuals. This is a 3 per cent sample of the Canadian population.
The basic independent variable used in this paper is 'visible-minority status' as per the employment equity definition.5 We use the visible-minority flag and the Aboriginal ethnic origin flag to define every individual as either white, visible minority, or Aboriginal. We define as 'white' all people who report only European, Australian, American, or Canadian6 ethnic origins. We define as 'visible minority' all people who report any ethnic origins that are not captured in the white group and who do not report an Aboriginal ethnic origin. We define as 'Aboriginal' all people who report any Aboriginal ethnic origins. These three mutually exclusive aggregate ethnic categories include people who report multiple ethnic origins. We also separate persons born in Canada from immigrants. We are left with three exclusive categories of Canadian-born individuals7 (white, visible minority, and Aboriginal) and two exclusive categories of immigrants individuals (white and visible minority). In the latter part of the paper, we break these five basic groups into seventy-eight detailed ethnicity/immigration status categories.
The basic dependent variable in this paper is earnings from wages and salaries. The wage labour market is the largest sector of Canada's labour force, comprising 87 per cent of all working men and 93 per cent of working women age 20 to 64 (1991 Census PUMF). Because visible minorities are more likely to be selfemployed than whites, however, our analysis has the potential to overestimate earnings gaps among visible minority groups if there is a propensity for highly motivated (or high earnings) workers to enter the self-employed sector.
The data frame for our empirical work is permanent residents of Canada, age 20 to 64, not in school full time, living in provinces outside the Atlantic region8 (Quebec and west) whose primary source of income was from wage labour sources.9 10 That we run regressions on only the employed population suggests that 5 Under Employment Equity legislation, a person is defined as a member of a visible minority if s/he is neither Aboriginal nor Caucasian in race and non-white in colour. In the public use file of the Census, the visible-minority variable is imputed to be a combination of ethnic origin, place of birth, and mother tongue. Operationally, the visible-minority variable is flagged for persons who are entirely non-aboriginal and non-European in ancestral origin. 6 'Canadian' ethnic origin is reported by approximately 10 per cent of the sample. These cases are classified as 'white.' 7 Our Canadian-born category includes all people born in Canada plus people who are Canadian by birth but were born abroad (that is, Canadian citizens born of Canadian nationals in other countries). All Aboriginals are classified as Canadian born in the regressions involving aggregate ethnic categories. As shown in appendix In non-CMA areas, the overall earnings structure is lower than for all persons, but the earnings pattern is similar. However, there were relatively few visible minorities born in Canada living outside the CMAs. It is thus difficult to conduct any detailed analysis at this level. In the eighteen non-Atlantic CMA regions, the average earnings and the disparities in earnings between visible minorities and whites are higher than is the case for the non-CMA residents. In the CMAs, Canadianborn visible minority men earn almost $5,000 less than Canadian-born white men. Immigrant visible-minority men and Aboriginal men earn on average about $7,000 less than Canadian-born white men.
The picture for women is somewhat different. For CMA residents, Canadianborn visible minority women and immigrant white women have average earnings roughly equal to the average earnings of Canadian-born white women. In contrast, Aboriginal women and immigrant visible-minority women earn on average $2-3,000 less than Canadian-born white women. use three groups of individual characteristics as controls in our estimation. We define personal characteristics as potential labour market experience (both Canadian and foreign), education, household type, and official language knowledge. Personal characteristics are included in all regressions. We define location as CMA of residence for CMA residents and province of residence for non-CMA residents. We define work characteristics as occupation, industry, full-time/part-time status, and weeks worked. Location and work characteristics are added to the control list in some regressions. Table 2 shows selected coefficients from regressions of log-earnings on individual characteristics, with separate regressions for men and women. We present several specifications that vary in their sample universe -either all residents, CMA residents, or non-CMA residents -and vary in the control list -either personal characteristics only, personal characteristics and location, or personal characteristics, location, and work characteristics. In regressions 2.1 and 2.6 we estimate log-earnings regressions on all provincial residents outside the Atlantic region, including only personal characteristics as regressors. In regressions, 2.2-2.3 and 2.7-2.8, we split the population into CMA residents, with added location controls for eighteen CMAs, and non-CMA residents, with added location controls for six non-Atlantic provinces, and control for personal characteristics. In regressions 2.4-2.5 and 2.9-2.10, we add work characteristics to the control list. In each regression, the comparison group for log-earnings differentials14 is denoted by the word 'comparison.' Regression 2.1 shows that if we take only personal characteristics as given and do not control for city or province of residence, then there are large15 and statistically significant earnings differences between white and visible minority men. In particular, we see an earnings gap of 10.0 per cent between Canadianborn visible-minority and Canadian-born white men, and a gap of 13.9 per cent between immigrant visible-minority and Canadian-born white men. Aboriginal men face an earnings gap of 33.1 per cent in comparison with Canadian-born white men.
There are earnings differentials between aggregate groups
Regressions 2.2 and 2.3 show coefficient estimates from separate log earnings 14 In loglinear models, coef'ficient estimates can be interpreted as revealing the percentage change in the left-hand side variable in response to a small change in the right-hand side variable. In our discussion of results, and in our tables, we treat coeflicients as if they reveal approximate percentage differences in earnings over changes in our dummy variables. However, dummy variables cannot change by a small amount; they can change only from zero to one or vice versa. Thus, for large coefticients, the per cent change in earnings is slightly larger than the coelficient estimate. For per cent changes of less than 10 per cent, however, the bias is less than one-hall' of one percentage point. 15 To say that a coef'ficient estimate is 'large' is to assert that it is economically significant. The unexplained gender wage gap is approximately 10-12 per cent (Kidd and Shannon 1994) and unexplained interindustry wage dif'frentials push wages away from the average by as much as ?20 per cent (Gera and Grenier, 1994); these differences are certainly considered large by social scientists working on discrimination or segmented markets. We treat differentials that are bigger than 5 per cent in absolute value as 'large.' Regressions 2.6 to 2.10 show the same models run for females. Regression 2.6 shows results from a regression that pools all women, both CMA and non-CMA residents, and includes controls only for personal characteristics. Here, we see no statistically significant earnings differentials across white and visible-minority women and a very large earnings gap of 19.8 per cent between Aboriginal women and Canadian-born white women. Regression 2.7 shows that among women in the non-CMA regions Aboriginals face a large earnings gap, but other groups do not.
16 Running separate regressions for urban and non-urban residents and running regressions on only urban residents introduce a possible selection bias into the regressions. In particular, unobserved characteristics that affect labour market outcomes may be correlated with geographic location decisions. We did not pursue a selectivity-bias corrected regression strategy, because the Public Use file of the 1991 Census does not have an instrument that is a priori correlated with choice of urban versus non-urban location but not correlated with potential earnings. For example, ethnocultural variables, such as language, ethnicity, and religion may be correlated with choice of urban versus non-urban location, but also may be correlated with potential earnings. If we assume that selectivity effects are very important, then regressions 2.1 and 2.6 are appropriate in that choice of geographic location is assumed to be fully endogenous, and regression coel'ficients provide consistent estimates of the direct ef'fect of group membership on earnings plus the indirect effect of group membership on earnings through choice of geographic location. On the other hand, if we assume that selectivity eff'ects are not important, then regressions 2.2-2.5 and 2.7-2.10 are appropriate in that they include controls for diff'erences across markets and provide consistent estimates of the direct effect of group membership on earnings by itself.
If we turn to regressions 2.8 and 2.10, which examiine women in the CMAs, it seems that the pattern of earnings differentials is quite different from that of men. Among Canadian-born women in the CMAs, whites and visible minorities earn about the same, regardless of whether or not work characteristics are included. Other groups of women in the CMAs do face earnings gaps. Immigrant white women earn slightly less than Canadian-born white women (see regressions 2.8 and 2.10), but the differential is not statistically significant in the regression controlling for work characteristics. Immigrant visible-minority women living in the CMAs face statistically significant earnings gaps of 8.3 per cent when we control for personal characteristics and 9.1 per cent when we control for both personal and work characteristics. In comparing regressions 2.5 and 2.10, we find two stark differences between the results for men and for women. First, although Canadianborn visible-minority men earn 8.2 per cent less than their white counterparts, Canadian-born visible minority women earn about the same as white Canadianborn women. Second, the differentials faced by Aboriginals and visible-minority immigrants seem to be about twice as large for men as for women.
In the next section we explore one common explanation for immigrant earnings differentials: real or perceived differences in human capital. In this section, we add a set of new variables that impute where immigrants got their educational credentials, and ask whether or not inclusion of these variables eliminates the earnings differentials faced by immigrant visible minorities. Because there are very few Canadian-born visible minorities and immigrant visible minorities outside the CMAs, we restrict the analysis from this point forward to focus on earnings differentials within the CMAs.
Visible minority immigrant differentials remain after controlling
for place of schooling Among educated immigrants, one important reason for an earnings penalty could be non-equivalence or non-recognition of academic credentials (see McDade 1988; daSilva 1992). If professional and technical degrees gained abroad are not recognized or are not equivalent to those gained in Canada, immigrants may face an earnings gap compared with similarly educated workers with Canadian degrees and certificates. If true skills go unrecognized, it may also be that Canada is losing a portion of its effective workforce. Table 3 examines issues of place of schooling by adding a series of variables which attempt to identify the place and highest level of schooling for imnmigrants. There are a number of rationales for why place of schooling may effect earnings, and why women may be more affected than males. First, it is possible that the quality of human capital acquired in Canada, the United States, or the United Kingdom is higher than that acquired elsewhere. Thus, employers may pay some immigrants less because a Master of Arts degree gained in Central Europe is less productive than one earned in Canada. Second, it is possible that even if credentials are productively identical, employers have no way of recognizing their relative worth. Third, professional organizations may simply refuse to recognize and grant membership to immigrants with foreign credentials in order to protect their market power.
A fourth explanation is that we may be confusing an immigration-policy-based selection problem among female immigrants with a human capital problem. Given that the head of a prospective immigrating family is likely to be male, men are more likely to be screened for occupational suitability and job readiness than is the case for women. Primary applicants in occupations that are in short supply or who have jobs prearranged in Canada are given preference in the immigrant intake; primary applicants are, in effect, prescreened. They are more likely to enter Canada with jobs ready for them, and thus with recognized and rewarded credentials. It is likely that women more often come in as part of the accompanying family (rather than as the primary applicant) and are not screened on the basis of educational qualifications. They are therefore more susceptible to losing their human capital or not getting its full return.
Although we find large and statistically significant earnings differences between those immigrants who completed their education in Canada and those immigrants who completed their education abroad, we find that immigrant earnings gaps remain even after place of education is added to the control list. In particular, even when we include controls for personal characteristics, location, work characteristics, and place of education, immigrant visible-minority men and women face earnings gaps of 16.2 per cent and 7.8 per cent, respectively, in comparison with Canadian-born white workers.
Earnings gaps are not fully explained by characteristics
In sections 3.1 and 3.2, we found large and statistically significant earnings gaps between our aggregate ethnicity/immigration groups. It is natural to ask if these differentials are dependent on our specification that earnings differences come in as a single dummy variable for each group. In this section, we use a more general specification, allowing a separate earnings equation for each of the five groups. Using this more general specification, we ask whether differences in average log earnings across groups are due to differences in individual characteristics. Table 4 shows the results of Oaxaca decompositions of the differences in mean log earnings across groups. Column A shows the mean log earnings for each group (these data are also shown in table 1, CMA residents only). Column B shows the mean log earnings of each group, if the returns to characteristics were given by a single non-discriminatory earnings profile for all groups. Following Cotton (1988), we define this hypothetical non-discriminatory earnings profile as the weighted average of the group-specific earnings profiles, with weights being equal to population proportions.
Column C shows the difference in each group's mean log earnings and the comparison group's mean log earnings evaluated on the non-discriminatory earnings profile. Thus, Column C is a measure of mean log earnings difference due to characteristics. Column D shows the difference between each group's mean log earnings (using that group's actual earnings profile) and that group's mean log earnings on the non-discriminatory earnings profile. Since characteristics are held constant, this difference can be interpreted as a measure of discrimination if negative, or privilege if positive. Finally, Columnn E shows the difference between each group's privilege or discrimination and the comparison group's privilege or discrimination, which measures the advantage of the comparison group over the other groups. In all cases, the comparison group is Canadian-born white.
Looking first at Canadian-born males, we see from columns C and E that the 0.208 gap in average log earnings between whites and visible minorities can be decomposed into 0.124 log earnings points due to characteristics, such as age and education level, and 0.083 log earnings points due to privilege and discrimination (Canadian-born white advantage). Similarly, although two-thirds of the 0.348 average log earnings gap between Aboriginal and Canadian-born white men can be explained by characteristics, 0.126 log earnings points can be interpreted as due to the advantage of Canadian-born white men over Aboriginal men.
Turning to the results for women, we find that the very small differences in average log earnings between Canadian-born visible-minority and Canadian-born white women may be decomposed into a small component due to characteristics and a small component due to Canadian-born white advantage. In contrast, the 0.190 difference in average log earnings between Aboriginal women and Canadian-born white women can be decomposed into 0.123 log earnings points due to characteristics and 0.067 log earnings points due to Canadian-born white advantage. The 0.105 difference in average log earnings between immigrant visible-minority women and Canadian-born white women can be decomposed into 0.019 log earnings points due to characteristics and 0.086 log earnings points due to Canadian-born white advantage.
Comparing these results with those given in table 2, regressions 2.5 and 2.10, we see that the estimated differentials in the linear model are very similar to the estimates of Canadian-born white advantage shown in table 4. Using a more general empirical model that allows for different earnings profiles across groups does not change our conclusions about the size and patterns of earnings differentials. Up to this point, each of the five groups has been treated as an homogeneous entity. However, each group has within it the possibility for a great deal of heterogeneity. The visible-minority aggregate category, for example, is a construct composed of nine distinct ethnic groups, which include, among others, persons of Asian, Central American, and African descent. Similarly, the white aggregate category comprises many distinct, largely European, ethnic groups.
One might ask how much variance is hidden within the five group model used thus far.18 We address this issue by identifying seventy-eight detailed ethnicity/immigration status groups (we define thirty-nine single-and multiple-origin ethnic groups by two immigration status groups) and estimating earnings differentials across these groups. To begin, the amount of within-group heterogeneity can be assessed by looking at the amount of variance explained in a regression of mean earnings by detailed ethnicity/immigration status group on the our five aggregate category dummies, plus an intercept. We find that the five basic group dummies do not explain a great deal of the variance in these data; for men, the basic groups explain 17 per cent of the variance in mean earnings across the seventy-eight detailed groups, and for women, the basic groups explain 25 per cent of the variance in mean earnings across the seventy-eight detailed groups. That the aggregate categories explain only a sinall fraction of intergroup earnings differences across ethnicities suggests that the visible-minority employment equity category may be a fairly blunt instrument. We explore this possibility by estimating log-earnings regressions with our seventy-eight detailed ethnicity/immigration status indicators. Table 5 shows earnings differentials for our detailed groups (table Al shows These results suggest that, when we evaluate earnings gaps among men, controlling for composition effects does not wash away the intercity differences reported in table 6, and indeed it makes some of these differences look even larger.
Turning to the results for women, we see a rather different picture. None of the 1i coefficients in regression 7.2 is individually statistically significant, and the eight (Di coefficients are jointly statistically insignificant at the 1 per cent level. Thus, the intercity differences reported in regressions 6.4-6.6 may be due to the different detailed ethnicity/immigration group compositions of the three cities. The moral of table 7 is that for men (but not women), the city-specific differentials given in table 6 are probably not artefacts, owing to the ethnic composition of the populations. Rather, Canadian-born visible-minority men may well experience much larger earnings gaps in Montreal than in either Toronto or Vancouver, and they may face no earnings gap in Vancouver.
Discussion
Our research shows that among men there are substantial earnings differentials between visible-minority and white workers in the CMAs we examined. Regression We believe that the 8.2 per cent earnings differential we found between Canadian-born white men and Canadian-born visible-minority men is very im-portant. Unlike the gaps between immigrant and Canadian-born workers, which may erode over time as immigrants assimilate into Canadian labour markets, we are not as hopeful that the earnings gaps found within the Canadian-born population will disappear over time. Further, although some earnings differences between immigrants and the Canadian born may be due to differences in preferences, we believe that Canadian-born white workers and Canadian-born visible-minority workers have similar preferences, so that earnings gaps are due primarily to differential opportunities.20 Thus, these earnings gaps found among Canadian-born ethnic groups suggest that economic discrimination may play an important role in Canadian labour markets.
We find that, for immigrants, place and level of schooling go a little way to explain the earnings gaps faced by immigrant men and somewhat further to explain the earnings gaps faced by immigrant women, but even when we control for (imputed) foreign education, large earnings gaps remain. Thus, even visible minority immigrants educated in Canada face large earnings gaps, compared with Canadian-born white workers.
Although we find large differentials between whites and visible minorities, our research also points to substantial heterogeneity within these groups. Lumping all the white ethnic groups together or combining all the visible-minority ethnic groups together does not do justice to the complexity of ethnicity-based earnings differentials. We also found that even some men and women of multiple ethnic origin face earnings gaps, suggesting that people of multiple ethnic origin, a rapidly growing segment of Canadian society, need to be treated separately in analysis.
Finally, it seems that ethnicity-based earnings gaps differ greatly across Canada's three largest CMAs. In comparison with Canadian-born white men, Canadian-born visible-minority men face earnings gaps of 16.7 per cent in Montreal, 8.9 per cent in Toronto, and 3.6 per cent in Vancouver. Although Canadian-born visibleminority women do not face statistically significant earnings gaps in the three cities, immigrant visible-minority women face earnings gaps of 19.6 per cent in Montreal, 5.9 per cent in Toronto, and 2.4 per cent in Vancouver.
These findings could have serious implications for the employment equity legislation, immigration, and schooling accreditation policies. First, it appears that despite having Canadian credentials and being socialized in Canada, visible minorities born in Canada face substantial earnings penalties. If these earnings differentials are due to discrimination, it may be an argument for some kind of equalizing policy, such as quotas, comparable worth/pay equity, or hiring policy. The existing federal Employment Equity Legislation is a hiring policy (not a quota policy), which pushes governments to hire designated group members in instances where candi-20 Culturally rooted differences in preferences across groups may not disappear after one generation in Canada. Sowell (1996) suggests that culturally rooted preferences may be important to labour market outcomes, even for second-and third-generation workers. If these differences in preferences manifest themselves primarily in education, industry, or occupation choice, however, then the results of the present paper (which control for these variables) are still quite suggestive of discriminatory earnings gaps across groups.
dates have similar qualifications. At best, however, a hiring policy can eliminate only discrimination due to allocation across industries and occupation. Our findings suggest that even after controlling for such differences, substantial earnings gaps between ethnic groups remain. Regarding immigrants, it is apparent that the earnings differences attributable to place of education differ by sex and across country of birth. Among men, there are large earnings differentials associated with finishing education in Central Europe and Other (including Northern) Europe. However, there is no earnings differential associated with finishing education in Asia and Africa. From a policy standpoint, this suggests that instituting a means of recognizing foreign credentials may help some European immigrant men, but may not affect the earnings of non-European immigrant men -that is, visible-minority immigrant men. Among women, the penalty associated with place of education also varies across country of birth, and such penalties explain a larger proportion of earnings differentials than they do for men. In particular, women who completed their education in Asia or Africa earn 16.4 per cent less than those with the same place of birth who completed their education in Canada. This suggests that a policy aimed at solving credential recognition problems may help visible-minority imigrant women.
The differences we found between men and women and within our broad ethnic groups indicate that we must be very careful in discussions of ethnicity-based earnings gaps and discrimination to specify whom we mean when we talk about the disadvantaged. In particular, employment equity policy that does not differentiate between the situations of visible-minority men and visible-minority women may be inappropriate. Further, we find evidence that the visibleminority category itself may be quite misleading as an indicator for anti-discrimination policy, since it seems to capture some ethnic groups that face earnings gaps and some ethnic groups that do not. Finally, the large differences we found across cities suggest that any national employment equity policy should be consistent with equity and discrimination issues that differ greatly across localities. 
